What do infantry soldiers carry

Although quadruped robots like BigDog from Boston Dynamics is no longer in the running it turned out to be a bit too noisy , there are numerous wheeled alternatives. The U. Such robots can operate on their own either following a leader or plotting their own route cross-country using GPS waypoints.

A key requirement is that no soldiers are taken out of the front line to handle the robots. But these robot mules primary objective is not to take the weight of its human counterparts, but instead to reduce casualties by eliminating the need to expose soldiers while resupplying.

In fact, given a robot assistant, many commanders would carry even more weight, such as a. There's another issue: Putting all your ammunition on a big, noisy machine that cannot take cover comes with its own inherent risks as well. Again though, increased carrying capacity, is an invitation to increase the load. An exoskeleton is an invitation to add more protection, meaning heavier armor, and potentially more powerful weapons.

Commanders and soldiers plan for the worst and expect the supply system to fail, which it rarely does. The Project Payne study cites the Battle of Long Tan in Vietnam where Australian soldiers fought for more than two hours with just three round magazines each, without running out of ammunition. But even this approach can seem fraught with danger. Faced with uncertainty, commanders default to the lowest-risk approach of taking everything possible. Compared to WWII, modern armies are much more risk-averse.

Heavier loads may cause back strain and knee problems, but giving troops more protection and firepower—and communications and sensors with all those batteries—is a higher priority. Lighter loads are unlikely unless we start accepting the risk of more casualties, and in the modern era of the hour news cycle, that seems more unlikely than ever. Type keyword s to search.

Today's Top Stories. Kim Jae-Hwan Getty Images. This is one problem which technology alone may not be able to solve. A Heavy History. Hulton Archive Getty Images. The research cited above illustrates the effect of weight on elements of physical performance, but there is a dearth of research connecting this to measures of combat effectiveness. This lack of definitive Army testing linking load and combat effectiveness continues to provide the illusion that carrying heavy weight is cost-free, which perpetuates a lack of action in solving the problem.

Under heavier loads and in more adverse terrain, soldiers move slower. The result is that soldiers often carry more into combat than is necessary. In WWI, 10 times as many rounds of ammunition were carried as were likely to be used. This ammunition quantity was not decreased after trucks and aircraft enabled front line resupply in WWII.

The ability of a soldier to march and fight is directly related to his load. The maximum individual load limit cannot be exceeded as an infantry soldier will not accomplish his mission. Soldiers fight light with only the equipment required for the immediate mission. They receive additional weapon systems and materiel when required. Of course, in practice, the limits specified in Army doctrine — 48 pounds fighting load and 72 pounds approach march load — are routinely violated.

He is still as heavily burdened as the soldier of years B. Technology has only given soldiers even more to carry: night vision goggles, radios, laptops, advanced body armor, GPS devices, and other equipment. Improvements in materials technology have led to only marginal reductions in armor weight, while keeping pace with protection from emerging threats. Future enemy adaptation will likely require continued improvements in protection, which only increases weight.

Soldiers march less distance in the same time under increased weight. Officially, Army doctrine acknowledges the tradeoffs of heavy loads. The combat strength of a unit cannot be counted solely by the number of soldiers but must be counted by the number of willing and physically able soldiers. The deleterious effects of load have been recognized and embodied in consistent weight load recommendations, but these have not been heeded.

Research as far back as the late s recommended a pound limit. He stipulated a lighter combat load, which he arbitrarily set as four-fifths of the training load or about 40 pounds. These sources led the Marine Corps study to recommend setting fighting and approach loads at 30 percent and 45 percent of body weight, respectively. Other sources also regularly cite the pound number. The Naval Research Advisory Committee report recommended a pound maximum assault load but cited six Marine duty positions with combat patrols exceeding that amount.

The remarkably consistent standards are not adhered to by either the Army or the Marine Corps, and the trend is not positive that this will change. Swift and agile movement, rapidity and assurance of thought are the true essentials.

There is a clear need to reconsider the deleterious effects of excessive weight on survivability. The weight soldiers carry is unhealthy and unsustainable. It has operational consequences due to the immediate cognitive and physical performance degradation. It inhibits proper respiration, power, endurance, and mobility. The long-term consequences limit recruitment and shorten careers.

Soldiers have only become more heavily burdened while warfare becomes more technological. Thinking about ways to improve survivability beyond traditional armor placed on the body will be necessary to protect soldiers from musculoskeletal injury and improve battlefield performance.

Army and Marine Corps doctrine acknowledges that carrying excess weight limits combat effectiveness. One problem in reducing weight has been that studies frequently tie load to slower soldier movement, which is intuitive, but often do not take the next step to link heavier loads to measures of operational effectiveness, such as marksmanship, maneuver, or exposure to enemy fire.

In order to truly optimize soldier load and performance, there must be a concerted effort to understand and advertise the human performance implications of heavy loads. The Army should undertake an authoritative study to better assess the relationship between load and combat effectiveness, building on existing literature. This study should detail the limitations and risks of excessive load. The results should be socialized throughout the Army to inform leadership decisions about load configurations by mission requirements.

Military doctrine on weight limits, changed if necessary based on the human performance assessment, should be enforced with the aim to improve soldier combat preparedness by decreasing the weight carried and adjusting to operational requirements.

Part of this effort should be examining which supplies soldiers truly need on the battlefield and opportunities for resupply. The Army should undertake a thorough assessment of necessary supplies and the fidelity of timely resupply, and educate leaders on the importance of minimizing loads. This means reducing equipment carried, such as ammunition, to only that which is mission critical and will be reasonably used.

In addition, the physical operating environment should dictate weight limits, as difficult terrain, such as mountains, limits the amount of weight soldiers can reasonably carry. For every pound of additional equipment fielded, a pound should be removed. This is principally a leadership and training issue, but the problem is hard to resolve given the heavy burden of all the equipment that is assumed to be needed today. The historical recommendations to enable the best agility, cognition, and stamina on the battlefield, as well as protect from injury, all approximate 50 pounds.

The weight of protective body armor makes adding necessary equipment and still meeting the weight limit essentially impossible, which highlights the importance of minimizing armor weight. Current torso body armor weighs approximately 32 pounds, leaving only 18 pounds for additional equipment. An M4 carbine with optics weighs approximately 7 pounds, empty. A camelback with ounces of water weighs almost 7 pounds.

Night vision devices, a hand grenade, and one MRE add 3. Body armor itself is modular, and in theory allows commanders to tailor the level of protection to operational needs, reducing weight to increase mobility as needed. Anecdotally, however, most commanders do not vary the elements used.

The appropriate level of protection depends on a variety of conditions: the enemy threat, terrain, and mission, among other factors. Army doctrine teaches that commanders should take into account the mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time METT-T when planning operations.

For example, wearing heavy body armor may not be operationally practical on a long-range multi-day patrol in mountainous terrain, such as in Afghanistan. In practice, the decision of which protective level to wear is usually restricted to senior leaders.

On-the-ground commanders are rarely clearly delegated the authority necessary to adjust the level of protection to conditions on the ground, especially at the company level. Army leaders are justifiably concerned that that if they made a reasonable choice to balance the level of protection against the tradeoff in additional weight and mobility and a soldier was injured or killed as a result, their decision would be second-guessed by DoD superiors and Congressional leadership.

This unfortunate situation harms soldiers in the long run. An overly risk-averse approach that does not allow commanders to adjust the protection level based on specific conditions on the ground may hamper soldier mobility.

This is not a technical or material problem but rather is primarily a cultural and policy problem. Commanders do not have the clearly delegated authority and backing from superiors, including DoD civilian and Congressional leadership, to modify the level of protection to specific METT-T conditions. The Army should clearly delegate authority to company-level commanders to modify the level of protection as needed, based on the specific threat and mission.

Near-term prospects for technological improvements that would fundamentally change the weight-mobility tradeoff are slim. Despite rapid gains throughout the midth century in body armor, progress in better materials has been incremental for the past several decades. From the Persian Gulf War to the Afghanistan War, for example, armor areal density decreased by 24 percent, or roughly only a 2.

As a result, body armor weight has actually increased significantly over the past 15 years. Better performance on infantry accuracy. Spread the training sessions out because the shooting skill is perishable. That is SAD. Many complaints of "expert marksmen" failing to hit barn at 40 yards on first deployment. Stop equipping CQB red dots on mountainous long range environments with no cover.

ACOG or better yet a variable zoom scope!!!! But someone who has more range time with iron sights will shoot better than any multi thousand dollar optic dude who has only shot rounds or less. The enemy uses Russian PKM. It's lighter than a FN and uses heavier ammo. It has slightly more range than 7.

The enemy has packable mortars. They have reliable reloadable RPGs. Need to equip more Carl Gustavs squad level. Blow hole in mud hut. Reload-able high explosive lobber. Bring back infantry mortars. Screw treaties. This is war. Our grunts are being out ranged by enemy not following treaty. And it doesn't take an Apache or Cobra to always save our grunts. They need more tools and weapons to select for what THEY feel is necessary.

Let the troops equip what they want. That's right. That's how special forces role. And they learn to adapt different weapons for different missions. That way they aren't overburdened with unnecessary shit. You guys give our guys single shot AT weapons.

The enemy has learned the range limits and slow mobility of our soldiers. The army never approved the hk21E. It was the lightest 7. Oh it's not has operated. It had no gas system to clog. It's a belt fed machine gun the weight of an average sniper system. Why complain???? No let the poor grunt carry a tank mounted FN Bravo crew served weapon firing same round at lbs. I'm not even military and I can pick better gear than these jerks do.

First off. Listen to troops. Let troops pick what they want and what they need. Then you will win. Here's an idea. Pick up enemy weapons and use their freaking ammo caches they bought… Because you can't always get resupplied. The Fins slaughtered the Russians that way.

They were too poor to buy much ammo. Why are you lugging tow missile launchers up a mountain side? By foot. When the enemy tanks don't climb said hills? Can't M by a rifle destroy a car as a TOW can?

No wonder grunts complain so much. The stupidity is real. A grunt will know more than the general about what the current threat environment is and what a required to destroy said threat. It added over a pound to rifle? You made a 5. Oh it's too heavy to use 7. Gives troops M4 carbine. In a wide open mountainous region of long range. Wonders why it lost the fight.

You guys and gals should look at lancer mags they are lighter than pmags. Ounces in quantity equal pounds. The aftermarket AR market has plenty of civilian products trusted by law enforcement good enough for duty use that is lighter and cheaper than kac rails.

No grunt complains of kac rails. They all say better rails that are lighter do exist and the military is ignoring it. I say they dont need but one rail and that's the top one on A3's were the handle used to be! I agree with you and others about training marksmen better. They don't need a laser sight, red dot, forward grip, and a damn spare to boot.

All you need on a normal battle field rifle is good optics and a flash light in your pack that is mountable if need be. I said it for 20 years before the newer 3x and 6x AR specific scopes came out that some of the older long field of view 6x scopes made for lever guns would be great for both CQB and regular meter ranged fire. It's all just bullshit and tacticool crap and made for TV money making back scratching.

All those contracts that flooded the AR15 M16 market after were dreams before that. I seen it coming a mile away when different companies started making AR15 M16 parts and mountable junk.

The whole modular craze hit with Generation Y and Z and not everything is better that way. If you can't hit your target with dry sights then you will never learn to hit with a optic either. Amen to your comments and others as well. It's all just a money game to make bucks for the Generals friends and get them a job after there 20 years in service. The move to the M Law was a critical step in AT weapon weight reduction for not as harsh armor environments.

The issue remains is no reload-able system remains in inventory to counter the RPG other than the heavy Carl gustav. The grunts are not typically using the AT weapons in anti armor roles in asymmetric fights. These offer more range against hardened targets or soft targets with great anti personal casualties. Some times the shock effect alone is good enough for the enemy to regroup and break contact like how throwing a frag grenade does.

The move to ML is good step in reducing weights. At same time they could have went to the Mk48 and Mk46 systems which are even lighter and were also developed to reduce weight further. Granted I am still a stupid civilian. It is hard for me to rationize carry pounds anywhere which is 22 pounds over my body limit.

Some infantry on gun forums m4carbine. The special forces operators were reporting carrying at least ten mags slightly downloaded rounds improving reliability. The scout infantry recon marine units reported often times humping that one hundred and fifty pound load on four day patrols because they had to carry all the camping tools to live off the land plus food etc.

Anti tank units reported briefly two hundred forty five pound loads which seems absurd from as far back as eighties. Word of mouth on Internet is some infantry had injuries on knees on training and the ruck loads felt as if it was a fiery pain upon removal. So heavy loads that falling over meant injuries. What's worse is no one sets a limit on how much ammo a guy or gal can grab in combat.

This grab and store all you can how you can because God knows if there will be more attitude exists. The Army website itself had a Medal of Honor page of how in Korea especially certain units ran out of ammo and died by not being resupplied in timely fashion. This fear of running out of ammo without resupply in combat at remains a hard reality.

Likewise today some soldiers are saying up to one hundred mags of 5. Usually when a HMMV or Stryker isn't an option and other guys and gals need ammo so some grunt hoofs it in as a ruck load. Usually with comments of never again did I ever do it and it still hurts but beats being dead comments.

Certain soldiers are reporting arthritis at 35 and many having fractured bones due to the physical toll of the work required. Comments of these brave men and women remain they don't complain about it because someone has to do it. At the same time they know they carry so much that an load related injury out of country in a war environment would prove deadly or very costly to a units success.

This is really disturbing. As far as logistics seems as if they have figured out how to cram even more ammo into vehicles. Although SOF is using more airdrops and caches than the current other branches are. Has anyone at the military looked at RMA level 4 body armor plates?

They advertise a multi hit protection against. Granted the medical bills two of those plates replace outweighs the costs. Other armor company plates are double the weight for same protection. I don't know how heavy the military plates are but I think this may be an improvement in the weight section. It would be interesting to figure out the weight of all the vests and bags used to carry infantry equipment. The old Kevlar depending on size weighed about 4.

Since then we've gone to ESAPI plates which, for the front and back, have increased their weight from 4 to 5 pounds each. The helmet on the other hand has been reduced from over 4 to about 3. Larger sized sets of armor, for larger people weigh more, and smaller ones weigh less naturally.

Recent advances in material development show promises for armor weight reduction but armor is only about a third of everything the soldier carries. Ammo, ammo, and more ammo is one thing soldiers need and want to carry with them. Comfort gear is at a minimum, if carried at all. Radios however, are a big thing and contribute in a very big way, so batteries because there's no place to charge them up again although that may change.

There are also many other items which are considered mission essential along with ammo in Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. The 6" X 6" side body armor RMA level 4 plates were 2. So combine with 8. This is not including plate carrier or soft gel armor inserts or military helmet weights. However the data I see is a pound military equivalent for literally same protection.

There's a huge endurance advantage by shedding some pounds. You can even get other brands soft armor that stops knifes and up to. There are many competing brands out there but they have to get through the testing. Dragonskin was one such back in the day, and seemed very competitive until it went through the army's testing process. I had considered buying some at the time myself, but am now glad I didn't as it didn't hold up to the temperature extremes.

That said however, there has been great strides forward and testing of new materials and possible replacements is ongoing so what they have for the soldier today is not likely to be what they will have in another year or three. Most of the time if not all the time the enemy will live off the land. Not as easy for outsider forces although the basics are the same no matter what country you are in. And they call us light infantry?

Maybe we should look at the FFL Legion and Russian forces and others even to this day they are light loaded, living of the land they are in, basic multi use kit and they still get the job done.

Big tip for the "Generals" get soldiers who have to carry all the crap to advise on what's needed! Clearly pen pushers have no idea. I'm an old jungle fighter. I always wondered why we didn't have pack mules. Pack mules were the signature of jungle infantry through WWII. I had some guy tell me that we couldn't because in WWI the most tonnage we shipped overseas was fodder for the animals. Well, duh! We were providing fodder for ourselves, the British, the French, the Belgians and so on.

And what's the creates tonnage we ship today? Which is fodder for motor vehicles and aircraft. In Viet Nam we typically carried 80 to lbs and had to be helicopter re-supplied virtually every day. And every dink within 20 miles knew where we were spending the night!

Why not use pack mules and cut those helicopter resupplies to once a week? I taught my men to shoot by setting up an enemy position with C-ration boxes that could not be seen from the firing line. I'd have a few troops in then prone shooting position and set up two bamboo poles, one on each flank, and stretch another pole or engineer tape between them and ask "Is the enemy OVER this tape or pole? I'd have the men "work" the box, evenly spacing shots into that area and then we'd walk into the jungle and examine the effect on the "enemy.

Then we'd work on unit firing. Officers and squad leaders carried solid tracer — no one else. Leaders would mark sectors of fire by firing pairs of shots, left, right and center — that pattern ensures everyone knows where the squad sector is. Officers and squad leaders would be alert to ensure all shots were going into the "box" or hitting short ricochets can kill, overs are wasted. A leader who spots a potential point target shoots tracer steadily at that point "Everyone shoot where I'm shooting.

Automatic fire with tracers means "Machine guns engage this target. Type and color changed daily. I can provide you the answer; less Infantry Generals, close the Infantry School. That translates immediately into less profit, less gear. The very neglect would be benign. I think the overall problem that no one is addressing is that our warfighters have lost the ability to adapt to the theater of war. We over encumber them with comfort items. I get it. I spent 8 years in the Marine Corps.

Field and combat environments suck.